

## Message Text

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TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 242416 TOSEC 280054

NODIS

FOLLOWING REPEAT LONDON 15561 ACTION SECSTATE 29 SEP 76.

QUOTE: S E C R E T LONDON 15561

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FOR SECRETARY FROM HARRIMAN

(AT GOVERNOR HARRIMAN'S REQUEST, THIS MESSAGE IS  
BEING TRANSMITTED TO DEPARTMENT ONLY. DEPARTMENT MAY  
WISH TO REPEAT TO BELGRADE PER PARA 1 OF REFTEL.)

E. O. 11652:XGDS -1

TAGS: PFOR, US, YU

SUBJECT: HARRIMAN TALK WITH EDUARD KARDELJ

REF: BELGRADE 6369

1. I RECEIVED AN EXTREMELY CORDIAL RECEPTION IN  
YUGOSLAVIA WITH ALL ARRANGEMENTS, I WAS TOLD, BEING  
PERSONALLY PLANNED BY PRESIDENT TITO, WHO WAS SAID TO  
HAVE CONTRACTED HEPATITIS AT COLOMBO. THEY INCLUDED NOT

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ONLY TALKS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER MINIC AND VICE

PRESIDENT ZORKOVIC IN BELGRADE AND EDUARD KARDELJ IN SKOPJE, BUT A VISIT TO BRIONI AND VANGA. I WAS INFORMED BY KARDELJ THAT THE REAL REASON A CONVALESCENT TITO COULD NOT SEE ME WAS LEST THE SOVIETS BE OFFENDED AFTER THE POSTPONEMENT OF BREZHNEV'S VISIT TO NOVEMBER. I WAS INVITED TO RETURN ANY TIME AFTER THAT.

2. AS YOU MIGHT HAVE EXPECTED, ONLY MY TALK WITH KARDELJ WAS SIGNIFICANT. WE AGREED TO BE COMPLETELY FRANK BECAUSE OF THE CURRENT MISUNDERSTANDINGS IN US-YUGOSLAV RELATIONS, PRINCIPALLY THEIR WORRY OVER PERCEIVED USG LACK OF CONCERN ABOUT CROATIAN TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN THE US. OUR MAIN SUBJECTS WERE THE US-YUGOSLAV RELATIONSHIP, EASTERN EUROPE, NON-PROLIFERATION AND COLOMBO. YOU WILL BE ALSO INTERESTED IN HIS APPEAL ON ANGOLA.

3. KARDELJ RECOGNIZED THAT THE CROATIAN SEPARATISTS IN THE UNITED STATES WERE INSIGNIFICANT NOW. HOWEVER, THE HEAVY MEDIA COVERAGE OF THEIR ACTIVITIES AS WELL AS STEADY PRESS SPECULATION ABOUT THE TITO SUCCESSION RAISE QUESTIONS ABOUT YUGOSLAVIA'S VIABILITY AFTER TITO. KARDELJ MAINTAINED THAT SEPARATISM WITHIN YUGOSLAVIA WAS PRESENTLY NEGLIGIBLE BUT THAT THE YUGOSLAVS BELIEVED ALL THE TALK WAS A MANIFESTATION OF THE US-USSR COMPETITION AND BECAUSE OF YUGOSLAVIA'S STRATEGIC LOCATION AND PRESENT INTERNATIONAL ROLE. ACCORDING TO KARDELJ, WESTERN SPECULATION IS VIEWED BY PRO-SOVIET ELEMENTS AS AN ATTEMPT TO PULL YUGOSLAVIA INTO THE WESTERN ORBIT. KARDELJ BELIEVED THAT IF ANY CONFLICT ENSUED, ONLY THE SOVIET UNION COULD COME OUT AHEAD. HE SAID YUGOSLAVIA'S PRESENT POLICY WAS IN US INTERESTS AND HE THEREFORE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND THE PRESSURE FROM US. HE WAS CONVINCED THE SUCCESSION WOULD BE ORDERLY AND WITHOUT UNDUE DIFFICULTIES.

4. I RESPONDED THAT I KNEW OF NO RESPONSIBLE FORCE IN THE UNITED STATES WHO HAD A DESIRE TO WEAKEN YUGOSLAVIA, THAT WE ONLY WISHED TO ASSIST IN STRENGTHENING YUGOSLAVIA'S COMPLETE INDEPENDENCE AND UNITY.

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I ACKNOWLEDGED THAT I WAS VERY DISTURBED BY KARDELJ'S COMMENT AND WAS PREVIOUSLY UNAWARE OF THE DEPTH OF HIS CONCERN. I SAID OUR ONLY CONCERN WAS THAT SEPARATISM WOULD BE ENCOURAGED BY MOSCOW. THE YUGOSLAVS MUST REST ASSURED THAT THEY COULD COME TO THE UNITED STATES FOR HELP IF NEEDED AS THEY DID WITH PRESIDENT TRUMAN IN 1951.

5. I ALSO DISCUSSED BASKET III TO WHICH HEAVY POLITICAL IMPORTANCE WAS ATTACHED IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE EAST BERLIN COMMUNIST CONFERENCE. ON BASKET III, KARDELJ SAID THAT WE MUST NOT EXPECT FAST RESULTS. CONCRETE PRACTICAL STEPS SHOULD BE TAKEN, BUT NOT STEPS WHICH INCREASE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION; RATHER THOSE WHICH BUILD PRACTICAL COOPERATION. I WENT OVER THE JEWISH EMIGRATION AND MFN AND TRADE ISSUES. ON THE LATTER, KARDELJ'S ONLY ADVICE WAS WHATEVER WE WANTED TO CALL IT, WE SHOULD GET IT DONE. ON EAST BERLIN CONFERENCE KARDELJ SAID THAT ONLY CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND BULGARIA COULD TRULY BE CALLED SATELLITES; THAT EVEN THE GDR WAS NOT COMPLETELY IN THAT CATEGORY. TREMENDOUS CHANGES HAD TAKEN PLACE SINCE THE WAR AND THE MOST IMPORTANT THING WAS THE US ATTITUDE--WHETHER TO PORTRAY THEM AS BLOC OR TREAT AS INDIVIDUALS AS WE SHOULD.

6. WE ALSO HAD A SHORT DISCUSSION OVER NON-PROLIFERATION. I EMPHASIZED OUR CONCERN OVER REPROCESSING AND THE CONSEQUENT NEED FOR STRICT CONTROLS. KARDELJ AGREED BUT AT THE SAME TIME SAID THAT SMALLER COUNTRIES MUST NOT BE DENIED THE BENEFITS OF PEACEFUL NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT. HE OBJECTED TO THE IAEA AS AN ORGANIZATION WHOSE PURPOSE WAS TO KEEP PEACEFUL NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY SOLELY IN THE HANDS OF THE MAJOR, COMPETING POWERS. HE COMMENTED IRONICALLY THAT YUGOSLAVIA AND OTHERS HAD AGREED TO GIVE UP THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, BUT DID NOT RECEIVE IN RETURN A GUARANTEE NOT TO HAVE SUCH WEAPONS USED AGAINST THEM.

7. KARDELJ HAD ALSO STRONGLY ATTACKED THE "SONNENFELDT DOCTRINE" AND I EXPLAINED THAT THERE WAS NO SUCH THING,  
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THAT THERE HAD BEEN A MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE WORD "ORGANIC," WHICH WAS INTENDED TO MEAN "NORMAL" RELATIONS. I ATTEMPTED TO CONVINCE HIM THAT BOTH PARTIES WERE FIRMLY FOR A LOOSENING IN EASTERN EUROPE, NOT IN SUPPORT OF GREATER SOVIET CONTROL.

8. I ALSO RAISED THE MEANING OF THE SOVIET CONVENTIONAL ARMS BUILDUP. I EMPHASIZED OUR CONCERN THAT THE SOVIETS WERE STRENGTHENING THEIR FORCES, NOT ONLY AGAINST CHINA, BUT IN CENTRAL EUROPE. I SAID I COULD NOT UNDERSTAND BECAUSE THE SOVIETS ALREADY HAD ADEQUATE FORCES THERE. THE IMPRESSION WAS ONLY ONE OF AGGRESSION AND THIS GAVE AMMUNITION TO OUR HAWKS. KARDELJ SAID THAT AS LONG AS THE WORLD WAS DIVIDED INTO BLOCS. EITHER SIDE'S DECISION WOULD BE IN TERMS OF ADVANTAGES

TO BE GAINED. CITING ANGOLA, HE CLAIMED THAT NETO WAS ORIGINALLY NON-ALIGNED BUT HAD TURNED TO THE SOVIETS WHEN THE US WOULD NOT GIVE HIM SUPPORT OR AT LEAST MEDIANTE. I SAID THE SOVIETS WENT TOO FAR WHEN THEY BROUGHT IN THE CUBAN TROOPS. KARDELJ COMMENTED THAT WAS ONLY ONE ASPECT FROM THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT'S POINT OF VIEW. HE APPEALED FOR A US INITIATIVE WITH NETO WHO "WANTED TO RETURN" TO THE NON-ALIGNED. ON YOUR RHODESIAN EFFORT, KARDELJ SAID YUGOSLAVIA WOULD TAKE WHATEVER ATTITUDE TANZANIA DID. FINALLY, I ASKED KARDELJ ABOUT THE PRESENCE OF SOVIET SUBMARINES AND OTHER SHIPS IN DALMATIAN PORTS.

9. KARDELJ STATED THAT NEITHER THE SOVIETS NOR OTHERS WOULD BE ALLOWED TO HAVE "BASES" ON THE DALMATIAN COAST. HE SAID THAT SOME TIME AGO THE YUGOSLAVS PUBLISHED A LAW GIVING ABSOLUTELY EQUAL STATUS TO ALL VESSELS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. SOVIET VESSELS ARE ALLOWED TO SPEND A SPECIFIED PERIOD OF TIME FOR REPAIR AND NO MORE AND SO WOULD THE VESSELS OF OTHER COUNTRIES.

10. AFTER LUNCH, I ASKED KARDELJ IF I COULD HAVE A FEW MINUTES ALONE WITH HIS OWN INTERPRETER. I SAID I WANTED TO TELL HIM WHAT I WOULD HAVE SAID TO TITO IF WE HAD MET: THAT THE US RESPECTED YUGOSLAVIA'S NON-ALIGNMENT BUT COULD NOT UNDERSTAND HOW TITO COULD  
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ALWAYS CRITICIZE THE US AT NON-ALIGNED CONFERENCES SUCH AS THE RECENT COLOMBO MEETING. I ASKED WHETHER THE MARSHAL COULDN'T FIND SOMETHING TO CRITICIZE THE SOVIETS FOR TO KEEP A BALANCE. HIS CRITICISMS OF THE US WERE IN MANY CASES RIDICULOUS AND UTTERLY UNCALLED FOR. I MENTIONED THE PUERTO RICAN INDEPENDENCE ISSUE AS AN EXAMPLE. HE REPLIED THAT TITO COULD NOT CRITICIZE THE SOVIETS BECAUSE YUGOSLAVIA AND THE USSR HAD A GENERAL AGREEMENT ON NON-CRITICISM FROM THE TIME THEY PATCHED UP THEIR DIFFICULTIES.

11. HE CONTINUED WE HAD TO RECOGNIZE THAT THERE WERE ALWAYS EXTREME ELEMENTS AT THESE MEETINGS WHICH TITO HAD TO OPPOSE. TITO FOUND IT NECESSARY IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN SOME BALANCE TO GIVE IN AT LEAST ON SOME POINTS WHICH WERE IN FACT CRITICAL OF THE US. KARDELJ SAID CASTRO HAD MADE A GREAT POINT OF PUERTO RICAN INDEPENDENCE; HE SEEMED A BIT SURPRISED WHEN I TOLD HIM THAT PUERTO RICO COULD HAVE ITS INDEPENDENCE TOMORROW IF IT WANTED. I SAID I DOUBTED, HOWEVER, IF TEN PERCENT OF THE PUERTO RICANS WOULD FAVOR IT.  
L2. I CONCLUDED THAT THE WHOLE SUBJECT WAS OF

IMPORTANCE IN OUR RELATIONS AS IT LED TO ANTI-YUGOSLAV  
FEELING WHICH AFFECTED THE MEMBERS OF OUR CONGRESS.  
IT COULD NOT BE EXPLAINED AWAY AND I ASKED THAT THE  
SUBJECT BE GIVEN SERIOUS CONSIDERATION. KARDELJ  
APPEARED NOT TO RESENT MY STATEMENTS AND TO ACCEPT  
THEIR SINCERITY. HE AGREED THAT YUGOSLAVIA'S  
FUTURE LAY IN A TRULY NON-ALIGNED STAND. I HAVE NO  
DOUBT HE WILL BRING OUR DISCUSSION TO TITO'S ATTENTION.

ARMSTRONG  
UNQUOTE ROBINSON

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